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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUMMARILY DENIED THE POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF PETITION 
The state inadvertently makes a strong case as to why the district court 
erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing. This is because in order to argue 
that the summary dismissal should be affirmed, it had to submit and rely on 
appendices hundreds of pages long which contained materials not considered by 
the district court. In short, the state does not really argue that the summary 
dismissal was correct for the reasons pronounced by the district court (and it was 
not). Rather, it argues the summary dismissal should be affirmed based on 
evidence and arguments never presented to or considered by the district court. 
But in addition to these new arguments being wrong, they would also require this 
Court to make legal and factual findings in the first instance. 
For example, the state argues for the first time on appeal that defense 
counsel successfully minimized the amount of evidence regarding Austin's 
knowledge of the murder because the only evidence of it presented at trial 
(besides Appellant's own statement) was the bare shed statement (I think my 
mother killed my father) and not the long version of what Adam Ketterling 
claimed Austin said which appears in a police report. The state goes on to claim 
that defense counsel excluded the long version, but never explains how trial 
counsel kept it out. The prosecution did not attempt to introduce the long version 
at trial (and so it wasn't kept out via defense objection) and what's more, the 
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prosecutor didn't even attempt to introduce the long version at the grand jury 
where defense counsel obviously wasn't present to object. 
The state then posits that defense counsel would not want to call Austin 
as a witness since it would have opened the floodgates and he would have been 
impeached with the long version of the shed statement which trial counsel 
worked hard to exclude. But the state fails to explain how Austin could be 
impeached with a police report detailing Adam Ketterling's statement to police, 
and of course Austin could not be impeached with someone else's statement. 
Further, there is no showing that Adam Ketterling himself could or would 
impeach Austin, because Adam did not testify to the same statement as 
contained in the police report at either the grand jury or the trial, but only to the 
short version. Finally, even if Austin was impeached, his testimony still would not 
do more harm than good because as it was (without him), the shed statement 
could not be controverted. 
Additionally, the state does not even attempt to dispute Appellant's point 
that trial counsel could have used Austin's denial of the shed statement (along 
with Amber's statements which confirm his movements and emotional state) to 
have the court reconsider its ruling admitting the shed statement as an excited 
utterance. Had the shed statement not have been admitted in the first place then 
Austin would not need to testify before the jury and so whether or not he could 
be impeached would not matter. 
As to Amber, while the state now claims (it did not below) that her 
memory has improved since trial and that her sworn affidavit is inconsistent with 
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her sworn trial testimony, this is a topic for the evidentiary hearing. Or at the very 
least had the state made this argument below, Amber would have had the 
opportunity to respond via affidavit and explain any inconsistencies. 
For example, while Amber did testify at trial that she did not remember 
seeing Austin when she went to her grandmother's house, the context of her 
answer suggests that she was focused on who she saw when she arrived and 
went in the house. Her affidavit shows that when she realized the importance of 
Austin's movements, she could remember seeing him, not in the house, but 
coming from the shed and on the back porch. 
The state argues that eliciting a different version on day 20 of the trial than 
she had testified to on day 7 was unlikely to be persuasive. This argument 
makes no sense because it is based on the fact that trial counsel did not 
conduct any cross examination of Amber because he would be calling her in the 
defense case in chief. However, had trial counsel been aware of what she 
actually could testify to regarding her knowledge of Austin's movements or 
emotions, he would have immediately had her correct her testimony in cross 
examination (or used it outside the presence of the jury while urging the court to 
reconsider its excited utterance ruling) and not have waited 13 days. Further, a 
contemporaneous correction of the testimony would not have been without value 
since the jury was aware that no memory in the case was fresh since the trial 
was occurring 4 ½ years after the murder. 
Finally, it must be remembered that this was a motion for summary 
disposition. While the state now picks nits about what Appellant did not prove 
3 
with her affidavits, such as what trial counsel knew, whether trial counsel would 
have interviewed Austin and Amber but for his belief the shed statement was 
inadmissible, and whether the decisions to not call Austin or ask Amber 
particular questions were tactical, this level of proof is not required to merit an 
evidentiary hearing. Rather, the petitioner needs only raise a material fact issue 
to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844 
(Ct.App. 1994). At that time trial the power of the subpoena can require trial 
counsel to appear in court and testify, as opposed to the earlier time when the 
petition is being prepared. And Appellant here raised a material fact issue via 
the affidavits of Austin and Amber that swore they would have testified to 
matters that would have changed the outcome of the criminal case but were not 
called by defense counsel and/or were not asked those questions by him. 
To summarize, the district court in this case summarily dismissed the 
petition, holding that no prejudice from any error of trial counsel was established 
because Adam Ketterling had been thoroughly impeached at trial. This decision 
was wrong as explained in Appellant's opening brief, and the state's new 
arguments or evidence do not show otherwise. Moreover, the state's new 
arguments are not even correct, but in any event Appellant urges this Court to 
reject the state's attempt to have it make factual and legal findings in the first 
instance based on evidence not considered by the district court. 
4 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above and in Appellant's opening 
brief, Appellant/Petitioner respectfully requests that the district court's summary 
denial of the post conviction petition be reversed and that this matter be 
remanded for an evidentiary hearing. 
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